2019 Conservative to 2024 Lib Dem Switchers are Not Liberal

Why it's important not to stereotype voters

Hello there! 😀

The 2024 general election saw the Liberal Democrats gain 60 seats from the Conservatives, many of them in the so-called ‘Blue Wall’ constituencies with a high proportion of university graduates and people who voted Remain in 2016.

This has led to a common story explaining the result. In this narrative, large numbers of Conservative voters switched to the Lib Dems and these switchers share a pro-EU, university-educated and socially liberal profile. Their decision to abandon the Conservatives was driven by a discomfort with the party’s views on issues such as Brexit and immigration, meaning the Lib Dems were now the party best aligned with their priorities.

Since the election, this interpretation argues, the Conservatives have been too focused on voters who moved to Reform, thereby overlooking the (just as numerous) voters they lost to the Lib Dems, but who require a very different strategy to be won back.

John Harris recently argued the following on the Conservatives’ losses in the South East, which is a good summary of the argument:

In many of them, a majority of voters had backed Remain in the 2016 referendum. The subsequent Tory embrace of hard Brexit left them reeling, and Boris Johnson’s amoral style of leadership only furthered their quiet despair. But there is something much deeper afoot in these places.

These parts of England are assuredly modern, and often more ethnically diverse than they used to be.

Those voters would be in the market for a centre-right party that emphasised the wonders of property ownership and low taxes, and pledged to back the interests of business.

What they find repellent, in my experience, is the Tory turn into fanaticism, and the sense that Farage – and now Trump – are pulling the strings.

At first glance, this explanation makes sense. When we think of places like Guildford and Tunbridge Wells, we picture well-off voters who love free-trade, free-markets and free-movement. And it’s true that the constituencies that went Conservative to Lib Dem did tend to be disproportionately Remain.

But how accurate is this characterisation of individual voters? Political commentary often relies on broad assumptions about voters, but these should always be tested against real data.

In this article, I’m going to use the British Election Study Internet Panel from the 2024 election¹ to look at three types of voter:

1. People who voted Conservative in 2019 and Lib Dem in 2024 (I’m going to call these ‘switchers’ for ease)

2. All others who voted Lib Dem in 2024

3. People who voted Conservative in 2024

Do these voters actually fit the popular image of pro-Remain, socially liberal graduates who abandoned the Conservatives due to a perceived rightward shift? Or does the data reveal a more complex picture?

If you can’t be bothered reading the whole thing, here are the results summarised in meme-form:

Who are ya?

First, let’s take a look at the demographics of these three groups. I’ve done this both by all respondents, as well as just people who live in constituencies that went from Conservative to Lib Dem in 2024.

Taking all respondents together, switchers look more like Conservative voters than other Lib Dems, particularly in terms of age, education, income and ethnicity. Overall, switchers are a pretty old, white and home-owning group of people.

But one measure stands out above all others: Brexit.

The majority (59%) of switchers voted Leave in 2016. This is not as many as Conservative voters (67%) but is a lot more than all other Lib Dem voters (16%).

Is this a different story in constituencies that went from Conservative to Lib Dem in 2024? Not really. Switchers here are younger and have a higher income. They are also more university educated, but it’s basically 50/50 rather than this being an overwhelmingly graduate group.

Again, though, look at Brexit. Far from being a movement of Remain-backers, switchers in these constituencies were as just as Leave-y as nationally (59%).

Taken together, this is not evidence that switchers are demographically unique from people who stuck with the Conservatives. Instead, there is a remarkable degree of similarity. The demographics of switchers look much more like the profile of a normie voter who leans socially conservative, rather than a bougie liberal.

Where Did 2019 Conservatives Go?

To understand how significant Conservative-to-Lib Dem switchers were in the 2024 election, here are where 2019 Conservative voters ended up.

The Conservatives only managed to hold onto about half of their 2019 voters, both nationally (50%) and in constituencies that flipped to the Lib Dems (48%), highlighting just how bad their performance was.

Crucially, the most common destination for former Conservative voters was not the Liberal Democrats, it was Reform. Around 20% of 2019 Conservative voters moved to Reform, both nationally (21%) and in seats that flipped to the Lib Dems (19%).

By contrast, the number of 2019 Conservatives who switched to the Lib Dems was much smaller. Nationally, only 4% made this move. Even in constituencies that flipped, the figure was just 9%.

Nationally, Labour gained more 2019 Conservative voters (10%) than the Lib Dems did. Even in constituencies that flipped, the number of Conservative-to-Labour switchers (7%) wasn’t too dissimilar to the number who moved to the Lib Dems.

Switchers were not the primary driver of Conservative losses. It was those who moved to Reform (and those who dropped out of voting altogether) who played the largest role in the collapse of the Conservative vote. Losing voters to the Lib Dems obviously didn’t help, but they were not the primary reason for Conservative loses, either nationally or in flipped constituencies.

Where Did 2024 Liberal Democrat Voters Come From?

Another way to test assumptions about Conservative-to-Lib Dem switchers is to look at who voted Liberal Democrat in 2024 and where they came from in 2019.

About half of 2024 Liberal Democrat voters were people who backed the party in 2019. This is a good result for the party! It suggests that they retained a core support and brought in a significant number of new voters.

Nationally, 17% of 2024 Liberal Democrat voters had backed the Conservatives in 2019, and this figure was 15% in seats that flipped. Similar proportions were made up of people who did not vote in 2019 (18% and 15%), either because they were too young or chose not to take part. Former Labour voters were also a notable part of the Lib Dem vote, making up 13% both nationally and in constituencies that flipped.

Taking this together, it gives a partial confirmation that former Conservatives were important in Lib Dem support. But it is important to stress that Lib Dem gains were made by bringing in people who had voted in very different ways in 2019, not just from the Conservatives.

Are They Actually Socially Liberal?

Demographics only tell part of the story. But what do these voters actually believe? A closer look at switchers’ views on key issues challenges the idea that they are socially liberal.

Almost half (48%) support the death penalty. While this is lower than Conservative voters (64%), it is far higher than among other Lib Dem voters (25%).

Even on a less extreme measure (support for tougher prison sentences) 72% of switchers agree. Again, this is lower than Conservative voters (82%) but far above the Lib Dem average (47%).

On immigration, switchers want numbers reduced by quite a lot. On a scale from +5 (allow many more) to -5 (allow many fewer), they score -2.0. This is less restrictive than Conservative voters (-2.9) but is a long way from other Liberal Democrats (+0.0).

Even Brexit attitudes follow a similar pattern. On a scale from +5 (unite with the EU) to -5 (greater independence from the EU), switchers score -0.6, suggesting they do not want a drastic shift in the UK’s relationship with the EU. They are also closer to Conservative voters (-2.3) than to Liberal Democrats (+2.7).

Breaking this down by their 2016 referendum vote, switchers are internally divided. Leave voters lean toward independence from the EU (-2.0), while Remain voters lean toward closer ties (+1.3).

But neither group is as extreme as their counterparts in the wider electorate. Leave switchers are less Eurosceptic than Leave-voting Conservatives (-3.7), and Remain switchers are less pro-EU than other Lib Dem Remainers (+3.1). This suggests a preference for mild alterations to the status quo from switchers rather than radical change in either direction.

On new culture war issues, a similar pattern emerges. On transgender athletes, all groups are opposed but switchers (88%) are almost as opposed as Conservatives (90%).

A similar, albeit less extreme, situation is seen for keeping up statues. About half (51%) of other Lib Dems are in favour, but switchers (69%) and Conservatives (82%) are much stronger in their support.

The lesson from all these attitudes is clear: switchers are not liberal. Whether on crime, immigration, Brexit or the ‘culture war’, they may not be as socially conservative as those who stayed Conservative – but they are much closer to them than to other Lib Dem voters.

Are They Actually Economically Right-Wing?

Although one common assumption about Conservative-to-Lib Dem switchers can be ruled out (social liberalism), the other is that they are economically right-wing.

On a scale from +5 (support for more government spending on social services even if it means higher taxes) to -5 (support for lower taxes even if it means less government spending), switchers score +1.3. Not the tax-cut-lovers of popular imagination! They are also much closer to other Lib Dems (+1.8) than Conservatives (+0.3).

On income redistribution, switchers are less supportive than other Lib Dems but not as opposed as Conservatives. On a +5 (support for government making incomes more equal) to -5 (oppose intervention) scale, they score -0.7. This means they are just about on the right, but are also basically halfway between other Liberal Democrats (+0.7) and Conservatives (-1.9).

When economic growth is framed as in opposition to the environment, switchers want a balance (-0.2). This is different to Conservatives who prioritise growth (+0.8) and other Lib Dems who prioritise climate change (-1.4).

When asked whether welfare benefits are too low, 29% of switchers agreed. Again, this puts them pretty much between other Lib Dem voters (51%) and Conservatives (10%).

Overall, switchers are not particularly right-wing on economic issues. Unlike their cultural attitudes (where they are much closer to Conservatives) their economic views fall between the two parties’ voters, leaning one way or the other depending on the specific issue.

Why Did They Stop Voting Conservative?

But precise issue positioning isn’t always what matters.

Given what we’ve seen so far, it’s not clear why a group of people who have similar demographics and social conservatism levels to people who stayed with the Conservatives would so throughly reject the party. It’s also unclear why such people would pick the Lib Dems.

In my first Substack post, I found that the main factor explaining Conservative losses were perceptions of competency and trustworthiness (‘valence’).

Once again, this was the reason why switchers abandoned the Conservatives.

Respondents were asked whether they thought politicians in each of the parties were competent (+5) or incompetent (-5). Switchers did not especially see Lib Dem politicians as competent (+0.4), but very much saw Conservative politicians as incompetent (-1.4).

The same situation occurred when asked about trustworthiness. Switchers did not see the Lib Dems as that trustworthy (+0.2), but saw Conservative politicians as very untrustworthy (-2.0).

Similarly, respondents were asked whether each party was ‘full of ideas’ (+5) to ‘out of ideas’ (-5). Again, switchers did not particularly endorse the Lib Dems (+0.9). What is clear is that they saw the Conservatives as completely out of ideas (-2.9).

For the Conservatives, the 2024 election was lost because so many switchers stopped trusting and didn’t think they were competent enough to deliver on what they were promising. Even though switchers shared the same desired outcomes as the Conservatives, they couldn’t trust them to deliver.

Why Did They Start Voting Lib Dem?

But why did they pick the Lib Dems? The results so far suggest they weren’t particularly liberal and didn’t particularly view the party in that positive of a light.

To answer this, we can look at responses to what each respondent though was the most important issue facing the country.

The concerns of Conservative-to-Lib Dem switchers were fairly similar to those of other groups. For switchers, their top issues were the general economy (19%), living costs (17%), healthcare (16%), and immigration (14%).

But the real question is who switchers trusted on their issue.

When asked which party was best to handle the issue that they named, switchers felt no party was best suited. On all of their top four issues, the most frequent response was none of the above – economy (36%), healthcare (51%), immigration (41%), and living costs (61%).²

The Liberal Democrats were not seen as the best party for any of these issues, with only 10% of switchers naming them as best on the economy, 9% on healthcare, and 10% on living costs.

On immigration, 20% of those who named it as a top issue said Reform was best to handle it! The Lib Dems weren’t even in the top four parties.³

The data here shows that the switchers’ vote was not a positive endorsement of the Lib Dems. Instead, this looks much more like a ‘none of the above’ protest vote.

These results are a good way of disproving a common assumption that when voters choose to switch from one party to another, it’s because they are actively seeking out a party that aligns with their values and priorities.

The Lib Dems provided a credible outlet for disillusioned voters who disliked the available options. Their success in attracting these voters reflects dissatisfaction with the political system rather than a surge in support for their policies or ideology.

What Does This All Mean?

People who voted Conservative in 2019 and switched to the Lib Dems in 2024 are not liberal.

They wanted immigration reduced – and reduced by a lot if this was their most important issue.

They wanted the government to be tough on crime – and almost half supported bringing back the death penalty.

The majority supported Leave in 2016 – and they do not seem to want to reopen the Brexit debate.

The reason they stopped voting Conservative was not because the party was ‘too right-wing’ but that the party was too incompetent. They saw the party as ineffective and incapable on the issues that mattered to them.

Their vote for the Lib Dems was not a positive vote for the party’s platform, but a none-of-the-above protest.

Is This Good News for the Conservative Party?

No!

Being seen as incompetent and untrustworthy is a far worse position to be in than being seen as ‘too right-wing’ or ‘too liberal.’

If the problem is policy positioning, the solution is straightforward: reposition on key issues to win back support.

However, when a party is seen as incompetent, regaining trust is far harder.

Being seen as incompetent means everyone abandons you, regardless of your policies. I’m sure switchers very much wanted to ‘stop the boats’. The problem was not that they disagreed with the objective, but that they had no faith in the Conservatives to achieve it.

If the Conservatives were able to regain the trust of switchers on the economy, immigration and crime, the likelihood of winning back switchers would be high. These voters share similar beliefs on these issues, making them a natural demographic for the Tories.

However, regaining trust and a reputation for competency is incredibly difficult to do in opposition. If people do not believe the Conservatives are competent, they will not vote for them. Without votes, they cannot form a government. And without governing, the Conservatives cannot prove their competency. If people do not believe the Conservatives are competent, they will not vote for them. Without votes, they cannot form a government, and so on and so on . . .

The previous government’s handling of key issues has left a lasting impression and voters who once supported them now struggle to believe that the party can be effective on these matters moving forward.

An incompetent Labour government is not going to make switchers go back to the Conservatives. Instead, it will more likely strengthen their none-of-the-above choice of the Lib Dems.

If, in 2029, voters have experienced, in recent memory, both an incompetent Labour government and an incompetent Conservative government, it will only reinforce the idea that voting Lib Dem as a protest was a good decision. The Lib Dems can continue positioning themselves as an alternative to the status quo, which keeps their message relevant and resonant to switchers.

The problem for the Conservatives trying to target Reform voters is that, as I found in my first post, they also stopped voting Conservative for competency reasons. This means that trying to win back Reform (or Lib Dem or Labour or non-voting) switchers with new policies is not the point.

Badenoch could advocate for everything a former Conservative wants, but they’re still unlikely to come back if they don’t trust the party to deliver.

The relatively good news is that former Conservatives have pretty similar policy preferences, so it won’t be that difficult to construct a manifesto that appeals to their 2019 coalition.

The very bad news for them is that proving competency and trustworthiness in opposition is really, really difficult.

But I’m going to go out on a limb and guess that publicly admitting your intra-Nigerian ethnic hatreds or your hatred of sandwiches is probably not the way to do it.

How To Win Friends OR Influence People

The Lib Dems should not misinterpret their new voters. Switchers’ support was not a validation of a progressive, pro-EU and socially liberal worldview. They may not be as socially conservative as Conservative voters, but they are far closer to them than to other Lib Dem voters. Ed Davey’s recent calls for the UK to rejoin the EU’s customs union, for example, could alienate these switchers, who are not particularly anti-Brexit.

However, this all depends on what the Lib Dems actually want to be and to do.

In UK politics, third parties essentially face two strategic options: follow the Lib Dems’ 1997-2010 and 2024 approach (win friends) or the Nigel Farage approach (influence people).

The win friends approach centres on becoming a likeable and approachable option for voters disillusioned with the major parties. Charles ‘Chatshow Charlie’ Kennedy was great at this. He could appear on TV shows and let his personality shine, making him relatable to a wide audience. His persona allowed the Lib Dems to draw in people with different beliefs, but who were united by a shared frustration with the system.

In 2005, the Lib Dems won 62 seats across a range of constituencies, some of which were not ‘liberal.’ In places like Chesterfield, North Norfolk and Torbay (where the Leave vote in 2016 would go on to be substantial) Kennedy’s approach helped the party resonate with voters who might not have otherwise identified with its policies.

In 2024, Ed Davey was very effective in reviving this strategy. Through memes, viral moments and the image of a nice guy, he rebranded the Lib Dems as a home for those wanting (undefined and vague) change, but not feeling aligned with Labour or the Conservatives. Voters didn’t back the party for its policies (I mean, how could they when their only policy was ‘be nicer to carers’?), but as a way to express this dissatisfaction.

But there’s a fundamental question about the long-term success of this approach: what do you actually accomplish when you become a friendly none-of-the-above option (other than winning seats)?

Being an all-purpose protest vote works great when you’re in opposition. People vote for you to reject the current system. But the moment you step into government (like the Lib Dems in 2010), the strategy falls apart. People who voted for you to protest the system see you become the system as you get your hands dirty in government. The popular but basically impossible promises you made when you thought you would be in permanent opposition (like scrapping tuition fees) you suddenly have to deliver.

And then, when the next election comes, you lose most of the seats you won having accomplished very little.⁴

This brings us to the second option for minor parties: influence people.

Farage’s goal was clear: he wanted the UK to leave the European Union and he succeeded. His efforts were instrumental and his continuing ability to influence the political agenda is undeniable.

From 2010 to 2015, the rise of UKIP put significant electoral pressure on the Conservatives. This made them shift their policies with David Cameron promising a referendum on EU membership in order to win back lost voters.

This re-started in 2019, when Farage’s Brexit Party played a key role in Theresa May’s resignation and the rise of Boris Johnson. The Brexit Party’s success made it clear that the Conservatives needed to fully commit to Brexit if they wanted to maintain power. Once they did that, Brexit Party support fell away and the Conservatives won a large majority.

In 2023 and 2024, Farage’s influence remained significant. Reform helped shift the focus of the Conservative Party back to immigration, with the Tories pledging to ‘stop the boats’ in the attempt to stem the bleeding.

Crucially, though, Farage’s influence doesn’t come from winning a large number of seats in Parliament. He’s proven that success in first-past-the-post (FPTP) elections isn’t necessary to push your agenda forward.

FPTP makes it difficult for a policy-driven third party to convert popular support into parliamentary representation. But if a minor party wins a sizeable chunk of the vote in constituencies across the country, it can prevent Labour or the Conservatives from winning the seat. This then forces them to adjust their platforms to capture those disaffected votes.

You don't need to win seats if you can win the policy debate. If your issues become central to the political conversation, the larger parties will eventually adopt them. Because they are more likely to form a majority government, you are then more likely to see your preferred policies put into effect – even if it isn’t your party doing it. This is what Farage has done time and time again.

If the Lib Dems stick with the Davey strategy, they could see even more success at the next election, especially as dissatisfaction with the political system continues to grow. But the question remains, what would they actually achieve with more MPs? A bigger presence in Parliament is appealing, but it doesn’t mean real influence.

Alternatively, by focusing on influencing people, the Lib Dems could adopt more defined and liberal policy positions: rejoining the European single market, a more open immigration policy, or stronger environmental protections. These policies would likely resonate with liberal-left voters disaffected with the Labour government. It would then likely force Labour to adopt their policies to prevent further losses.

However, these stances would mean fewer seats in Parliament, as they would no longer be the all-purpose protest vote and so would no longer be attracting a diverse set of voters enough to win many seats.

Stop Caricaturing Voters

If I can make one request, it is to please, please, please stop caricaturing voters.

When we do, analysis becomes exponentially worse. It’s easy to fall into the trap of oversimplifying the motivations and identities of voters, but doing so leads to poor conclusions and misguided strategies.

For instance, James Kanagasooriam’s original ‘Red Wall’ formulation described voters whose demographics meant they should have been very likely to vote Conservative (e.g. homeowners, earning decent incomes, married with children etc.). However, the historical context of where they lived (e.g. the legacy and memory of Margaret Thatcher) meant that they didn’t.

This insight was important because it recognised the complexity of voter behaviour. Voters in these areas were not simply defined by their individual status, but by the history of their local community.

The 2016 referendum acted as a catalyst for these reasonably well-off voters to feel a greater affinity for the Conservative Party, which led to their vote in 2017 and 2019.

Unfortunately, in the hands of political commentators, a bastardised version of the ‘Red Wall’ was created which distorted Kanagasooriam’s original formulation into a simplistic caricature of uneducated, unemployed, wife-beating, pie-eating, knuckle-dragging racist losers in some Northern town that political commentators thought had only just got running water.

This was not only unhelpful, but was also completely wrong. The original Red Wall idea was about individuals who were economically advantaged not disadvantaged. It was about showing how, even if a constituency is economically deprived, it doesn’t mean that everyone in it is economically deprived.

A similar distortion is probably going to happen all over again with the ‘Blue Wall.’

At its core, this should refer to voters whose demographics (university-educated, managerial occupations etc.) mean that they should be more competitive for Labour or the Liberal Democrats to win. However, as a reverse of the original Red Wall, they are more likely to vote Conservative than you would expect, because the party has historically looked after the Home Counties very well.

And yet, a twisted version could easily get peddled that paints a picture of these voters as all being Brexit-hating, immigration-loving, Gail’s-munching, upper-management, asset-hoarding, NIMBY, tax-dodging, cosmopolitan elites.

This kind of caricaturing isn’t just harmful to understanding the electorate, it also has real consequences for political parties.

The Lib Dems are in just as much danger as the Conservatives if they misread their new voters. It will be very tempting for Lib Dem politicians and campaigners to believe that the shift from Conservative to Lib Dem between 2019 and 2024 was driven by the university-educated, the Brexit-hating and the immigration-loving. That is what they want these voters to believe because, if that were true, the Lib Dems could pursue the policies they already favour without any political risk.

This is a classic case of motivated reasoning: seeing what you want to see rather than what is actually there.

If they assume that’s who their new voters are, they’ll tailor their policies to fit this image. The Lib Dems could head into the next election with liberal policies focused on Brexit and immigration that appeal to this distorted view of their voters.

What united these voters in 2024 was a rejection of the status quo. They wanted an alternative to a Conservative Party that they no longer trusted to run the economy and, yes, reduce immigration.

If the Lib Dems assume their new supporters fit a neat, London-centric, pro-EU, socially liberal mould, they will make the same mistake the Conservatives did: misunderstanding the electorate and taking their voters for granted.

Why The Focus On Conservative to Lib Dem Switchers?

‘Centrist’⁵ political commentators seem increasingly confident in their argument that the Conservatives are too preoccupied with winning back votes lost to Reform and should instead focus on recapturing those who have moved to the Lib Dems.

To be fair, betting against Kemi Badenoch’s political instincts is usually a safe move. But this may be one of the rare times when the Conservatives are actually making a rational decision – or at least a less irrational decision than usual – even if the execution of that idea has been horrible.

As we’ve seen, just because a seat changes hands from Conservative to Lib Dem does not mean that a significant number of individual voters made that specific switch. The number of voters the Conservatives lost to Reform was far, far greater than those who switched to the Lib Dems. This is true across the country and in the seats where the Lib Dems made gains. Losing votes to Reform presents a far bigger existential threat to the Conservative Party.

So why the focus on Lib Dem switchers? To my mind, there are a couple of potential reasons, and understanding them can help avoid flawed thinking (that dominates much of political commentary) in the future.

The first reason is that they don’t realise that there are a lot more voters who moved to Reform than to the Liberal Democrats. This is not just about a knowledge of the data, but about the assumptions made about the electorate.

‘Availability bias’ is a mental shortcut that causes people to overestimate the frequency of something based on how easily examples come to mind. We tend to think something is more common or significant if we can quickly recall examples of it. This can distort our perception, making us believe that things we are familiar with or encounter more often are representative, even when they aren’t.

For example, if you say ‘Surrey Conservative to Lib Dem’ to someone, they are likely to picture the stereotype of a liberal cosmopolitan. They are unlikely to picture someone who’s just a normal person going about their daily life – and are even less likely to picture someone who wants immigration reduced and to bring back hanging.

And yet, just because you can picture the stereotype of someone based on where they live does not mean that such a stereotype is the majority or even particularly numerous.

The archetype of the anti-Brexit Conservative to Lib Dem switcher is availability bias. They are there, for sure, but they are nowhere near as many as either:

• The switcher who chose the Lib Dems as a none-of-the-above option

• The person who voted Conservative in 2019 and moved to Reform in 2024

• The person who voted Conservative in 2019 and didn’t vote in 2024

In the context of political commentators, this is likely exacerbated by how they are more likely to interact with people who fit the Conservative to Lib Dem stereotype in their day-to-day life. Because commentators know people like this, it would be natural to overestimate the size of this group in the overall population.

This is why it’s important not to rely on caricatures or take anecdotal examples as representative. Qualitative methods provide interesting insights, but they shouldn't be used to answer quantitative questions about the electorate as a whole.

The second reason, in my view, for the over-focus on Lib Dem switchers is about viewing the electorate like a TV advertising executive.

In television, advertisers pay top money to show commercials on shows watched by younger, university-educated and middle-class people with disposable income. This is because advertisers are focused on the purchasing power of the audience and the potential to build long-term brand loyalty. This holds true even if the overall viewing figures for a show are relatively low, as long as the ‘right’ type of people are watching.

This contrasts with shows that attract many more viewers but end up making less money because their audience is less ‘desirable.’ For instance, the WWE/F in the late 1990s and early 2000s regularly attracted over 6 million viewers at the peak of the Attitude Era. Despite its large audience, the show struggled to secure high-paying spots because advertisers wrongly stereotyped wrestling fans as low-income and low-education. As a result, Raw and SmackDown were sponsored by products like Super Soakers and Chef Boyardee beef ravioli, while premium brands went to shows with fewer but more ‘attractive’ viewers.⁶

Although both shows aired on the BBC, Fleabag (around 2.5 million viewers at its peak) would have attracted much higher advertising rates than Mrs Brown’s Boys (around 11 million viewers at its peak), because the audience for Fleabag was made up of younger and more affluent people, whereas Mrs Brown’s Boys drew an older and more working-class audience.

This approach works for TV advertisers, because people with more disposable income really are ‘worth’ more.

But it is not the way to think about winning elections.

In politics, what matters is the quantity of votes – particularly if they live in swing constituencies – not how high-status a voter’s demographic are.

When I read some political commentary, I can’t help but feel that they see the electorate like an advertising executive, where the vote of a respectable, morally upstanding ‘right thinking’ Lib Dem is worth more than a vulgar, unsophisticated, non-U provincial Reform voter.

To be fair, this is also due to them agreeing with Lib Dem beliefs much more than Reform beliefs. This is fine when deciding your own personal politics, but their argument is that winning Lib Dem voters is more effective than winning Reform voters, which is not the same thing.

When it comes to strategy, it’s the numbers that matter. Reform voters who left the Conservatives are a much, much larger group, even in the areas the Conservatives lost to the Lib Dems.

In elections, there are no extra rewards for winning the vote of a 30-year-old, university-educated, high-income Remainer in Shoreditch. The vote of a 55-year-old, non-university educated, low-income Leaver in Fylde is worth exactly the same – and in a FPTP system is worth much more.

Mrs Brown’s Boys viewers decide elections. Fleabag viewers don’t.

1. Wave 27.

Because the vote intention question was based on answers before the election, I re-weighted the data based on the actual result. I also re-weighted (using raking) on age, gender, education, region and ethnicity, because the BESIP tends to (massively) underweight people who don’t vote or don’t have a degree:

Age

• 18-24: 10.6%

• 25-34: 16.9%

• 35-44: 16.5%

• 45-54: 16.9%

• 55-64: 15.8%

• 65-74: 12.5%

• 75+: 10.8%

Gender

• Male: 48.9%

• Female: 51.1%

Education

• Below degree: 66%

• Degree: 34%

Ethnicity

• White: 84.9%

• Asian: 8.1%

• Black: 3.4%

• Mixed: 1.8%

• Other: 1.8%

Region

• East of England: 9.6%

• Greater London: 13.4%

• North East: 4.1%

• North West: 11.4%

• Scotland: 8.3%

• South East: 14.2%

• South West: 9%

• Wales: 4.8%

• West Midlands: 9.1%

• Yorkshire and the Humber: 8.5%

Vote Intention

• Labour: 20.69%

• Conservative: 14.56%

• Reform UK: 8.78%

• Lib Dem: 7.50%

• Green: 4.12%

• Other or Independent: 2.12%

• SNP: 1.54%

• Plaid Cymru: 0.42%

• Not Vote: 40.27%

2. The Conservatives were not trusted on the key issues by people who had only recently voted for them. This can be most clearly illustrated by looking at switchers who took the BESIP survey during the 2019 election, where they were also asked what their most important issue was at the time.

In 2019, 80% of people who would go on to switch to the Liberal Democrats in 2024 were saying that the Conservatives were the best party to handle the issue they cared about. At that election, only 13% said they didn’t trust any party at all, with just 1% picking the Lib Dems. This highlights how significantly their trust in the Conservatives have shifted since then.

3. One objection to all this might be that those who named immigration as their most important issue in 2024 may have chosen ‘no party’ because none of the options were liberal enough for them. However, this is not the case.

Among people who listed immigration as their top issue, the average score for switchers it was -3.6, while this score was -3.5 for other Lib Dems and -4.2 for Conservatives. This indicates that switchers who cared about immigration were not looking for liberal policies.

4. I’m sure plenty of Lib Dems will name small small niche things they did in coalition, but whatever.

5. As in people who call themselves ‘centrist’. The views of people like this (free markets, free trade, free love and free movement of people) are the complete opposite of where average public opinion is.

6. James Dixon & Justin Henry, Titan Screwed: Lost Smiles, Stunners, and Screwjobs, History of Wrestling, 2016